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Abstract 
Objective. Two percent of patient deaths during hospital admissions are caused by 
preventable adverse events. To decrease the amount of preventable adverse events, learning 
from these events is necessary. This is only possible if they are reported. Just/blame culture 
can influence reporting of adverse events, and thus to patient safety. Leadership is a factor 
that could be of influence on just/blame culture. The goal of this study is to test a recently 
developed just/blame culture questionnaire on its reliability and validity for the use in 
healthcare institutions and to examine the relation between just/blame culture and having a 
transactional or transformational leader.  
Methods. The just/blame culture questionnaire and the short Multifactor Leadership 
Questionnaire (MLQ-24) were distributed via social media to people working in healthcare.  
Results. The just/blame culture questionnaire was not constructually valid and some sub-
constructs were not reliable. The questionnaire was transformed to acquire higher reliability 
and validity. The adjusted questionnaire was more reliable and had a higher validity, but was 
still not valid. There was a significant, positive relation between the score on the MLQ-24 
and the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire (F (df = 1, 87) = 6.976, p = .010). The 
score of the transformational scale was related significantly (F (df = 1, 87) = 10.115, p = 
.002) to the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire, but the transactional leadership 
scale was not (F (df = 1, 87) = 2.806, p = .098). People with a transformational leader 
experienced significantly more openness, fairness and trust than people with a transactional 
leader (F (df = 1, 94) = 9.289, p = .003). 
Conclusion. The current model of just/blame culture on which the questionnaire was based, 
seems to be incomplete. Leadership style has an influence on segments of just/blame culture, 
namely openness, fairness and trust. More research is necessary to broaden the definition of 
just/blame culture and to define the role of leadership in hospital culture. This can contribute 
to creating a safer hospital environment.    
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Introduction 
Adverse events in health care institutions       
 Adverse events are a common occurrence in healthcare institutions. Adverse events 
affect patient safety. Zegers and colleagues (2009) define an adverse event as “an unintended 
injury that results in temporary or permanent disability, death or prolonged hospital stay, and 
is caused by healthcare management rather than by the patient’s underlying disease process.” 
Adverse events per hospital admission were examined by Zegers et al. (2009). They found 
that in a sample of 7926 hospital admissions, one or more adverse events had occurred in 
5.7%. Of these adverse events, 39.5% was considered to be preventable. They also 
discovered that the incidence of preventable adverse events contributing to death was nearly 
2%, which means that in 157 of the 7926 hospital admissions, preventable adverse events 
contributed to the death of the patient. This would mean that in the general population, 
around 2% in all hospital admissions, preventable adverse events occur that contribute to the 
death of a patient. Baines, Langelaan, de Bruijne, Spreeuwenberg and Wagner (2015) 
compared adverse event rates of patients in Dutch hospitals, based on 16000 patient records 
from 2004, 2008 and 2011/2012. Adverse event rates of patients with at least one adverse 
event were 4% in 2004, 6% in 2008, and 5.7% in 2011/2012. Adverse events decreased 
between 2008 and 2011/2012, but adverse events still occur in a considerable amount of 
hospital admissions.  
 These results show that preventable adverse events in healthcare are still an important 
factor contributing to patient safety (Baines et al., 2015) and patient mortality (Zegers et al., 
2009). This raises the question: how can the number of preventable adverse events be 
reduced? In this thesis, one of the pathways to reduction of preventable adverse events will 
be studied, namely just/blame culture in healthcare institutions. The existence of a just/blame 
culture influences the reporting of adverse events, which is needed to enable learning of 
these events, and prevention of adverse events in the future.  
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 There are defenses in place to prevent adverse events, but despite these defenses, 
adverse events still occur. The Swiss cheese model describes how mistakes can occur even 
though there are barriers in place to prevent them. The model consists of several levels that 
each work as a barrier to prevent incidents from occurring. Each of the barriers has a 
possibility of failing. When one barrier fails, another one will stop the mistake from 
occurring, but sometimes several barriers fail. When all barriers fail, an adverse event can 
occur (Stein & Heiss, 2015). Ruchlin and Callahan (2004) state that errors occur when 
organizational, human, and technical defenses are lacking or not good enough. Stein and 
Heiss (2015) describe how five slices of the Swiss cheese model can be used to increase 
patient safety and prevent mistakes, i.e. training, healthcare technology and electronic 
medical records, checklists, policies and procedures, and communication.  
Wagner et al. (2008) stated that the errors in healthcare as a result of technical failure 
are decreasing, as opposed to the errors caused by human factors. These errors are not 
caused by one single person. The system, not the person is to blame for an error, as the 
system should take cognitive and physical shortcomings of humans into account. Thus, the 
entire system needs to be evaluated. In order to be able to evaluate the system and lower the 
number of preventable adverse events, medical errors should be reported, analyzed and 
evaluated in every case (Stein & Heiss, 2015; Wagner et al., 2008). When adverse events are 
reported, people can learn from previous experiences, and possibly change the cause of the 
error (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, 2000; Sammer, Lykens, Singh, Mains & Lackan, 2010; 
Wagner et al., 2008). This could help decrease the number of preventable adverse events, 
and thus increase patient safety (Heuver, Heijboer, Schilp & Wagner, 2015). When incidents 
are reported, measures should be taken to prevent this error to occur again (Wagner et al., 
2008). Drupsteen, Groeneweg and Zwetsloot (2013) add that next to prevention of 
recurrence of the same mistake, making the organization safer and improving the learning 
process should also be a priority.  
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Organizational learning 
To prevent errors and adverse events from occurring again, health care settings need 
to promote a culture of organizational learning and not a culture of blame (Stein & Heiss, 
2015). Organizational learning is defined by Carroll and Edmondson (2002) as “a process of 
increasing the capacity for effective organizational action through knowledge and 
understanding”.  
 The learning from incidents model. Drupsteen and colleagues (2013) proposed a 
model about learning from incidents in organizations, which has eleven steps that are divided 
in four stages: investigating and analyzing incidents, planning interventions, intervening, and 
evaluating (figure 1). Each of the stages is a part of the learning process and vital to learning 
from incidents. Each stage leads to a result, and when this result is incomplete or lacking, the 
next stage is less useful. When a step is not executed or not executed well, it is a bottleneck 
in the learning process. This leads to a loss of learning potential. The first stage is 
investigating and analyzing incidents, which has the following steps: incident reporting, 
incident registration, determining the depth and scope of research, fact finding and incident 
analysis.  
Figure 1. Model of the learning from incidents process. Reprinted from “Critical Steps in Learning from 
Incidents: Using Learning Potential in the Process From Reporting an Incident to Accident Prevention” by 
Dupsteen, L., Groeneweg, J. and Zwetsloot, G., 2013, International Journal of Occupational Safety and 
Ergonomics 19(1), 65.  
Copyright 2013 by TNO Work and Employment.  
 
 Several factors can promote organizational learning in health care settings. The 
organizational culture needs to be one which is psychologically safe and where people are 
free to speak up about issues or incidents that concern them, without facing the blame or 
consequences (Edmondson, 2004; Wagner et al., 2008). Also, workers need to be part of the 
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collective or group, instead of seen as an individual (Edmondson, 2004).   
 Another important factor influencing organizational learning, is the management and 
leadership style in a hospital (Amitay, Popper, Lipshitz, 2005). The management should 
support reporting adverse events (Wagner et al., 2008), and leaders should support 
organizational learning by creating an environment where people can reflect on actions and 
take action accordingly (Carroll & Edmondson, 2002). There is evidence that leadership 
style has an influence on the amount of organizational learning in a hospital (Amitay et al., 
2005; LeBrasseur, Whissell & Ojha, 2002). Amitay and colleagues (2005) found that 
transformational leadership is highly correlated with organizational learning in community 
clinics. LeBrasseur and others (2002) conclude that transformational leaders are more 
equipped to implement continuous quality improvement, and thus organizational learning in 
hospitals.  
 Khatri, Brown and Hicks (2009) state that the kind of environment that promotes 
organizational learning needs to have a just culture instead of a blame culture. A just culture 
is defined by Khatri and colleagues (2009) as “an environment supportive of open dialogue 
to facilitate safer practices”. Having a just culture promotes organizational learning, as an 
organization with a just culture is able to identify, report, and investigate incidents and 
adverse events. Only then, learning from previous adverse events and making improvements 
to the health care system is possible (Khatri et al., 2009).     
 As mentioned by Drupsteen and colleagues (2013), incident reporting is the first step 
in the model of learning from incidents, and when this first step is not taken or not executed 
properly, organizational learning is stunted. According to the research of Drupsteen and 
others (2013), the reporting and evaluating steps were the steps where most of the learning 
potential was lost. Whether incidents are reported and organizational learning is possible, 
depends on several factors, such as feelings of psychological safety, management and 
leadership style, and the organizational culture. Khatri and colleagues (2009) mention that 
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the existence of a blame or just culture can determine whether incidents are reported and can 
therefore influence patient safety.     
Just and blame culture         
 There have been numerous studies on the existence of a just or blame culture in 
health care and its influence on patient safety. Frankel, Leonard and Denham (2006) state 
that a just culture, together with the engagement of leadership in safety and good teamwork 
are essential to safe and reliable care for patients. A blame culture is defined by Khatri and 
colleagues (2009) as “a set of norms and attitudes within an organization characterized by an 
unwillingness to take risks or accept responsibility for mistakes, because of a fear of 
criticism or management admonishment”. However, there is no clear view of the exact 
constructs just/blame culture consists of, and there is no tool to measure the amount of 
just/blame culture. Just/blame culture consists of several different components, i.e. behavior, 
perception, feelings, education, and psychological safety. Just/blame culture influences 
reporting of adverse events, learning, and thus patient safety (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Just/blame culture model 
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 The first component of blame culture that influences the reporting of adverse events 
are the perceptions hospital employees have about openness, management and fair treatment 
when an error occurs. Edmondson (2004) states that a climate of openness makes it easier to 
report and discuss an adverse event. In a just culture, an open and blame-free climate is 
supported (Khatri et al., 2009). This climate is influenced by the relationships between 
colleagues in a team and the leader of a team (Edmondson, 2004). The influence of 
management on blame culture is also mentioned by Khatri et al. (2009). People should also 
expect to be treated fairly when reporting an error (Khatri et al., 2009).  
The second component determining blame or just culture is psychological safety. 
Employees need to feel psychologically safe, trust their team and management and not fear 
consequences of reporting mistakes (Khatri et al., 2009). Gorini, Miglioretti and Pravettoni 
(2012) add to this that healthcare employees should not fear being blamed. Psychological 
safety means that people have the impression that they can question the current protocols, 
express concerns, and admit mistakes (Khatri et al., 2009). In a just culture, people can rely 
on management to help them and support them when adverse events do occur (Khatri, 2009), 
and can rely on their team to communicate (Frankel et al., 2006). Edmondson (2004) states 
that people need to feel free to voice their concerns and errors. Also, people should be 
without fear of repercussions when reporting adverse events (Beyea, 2004; Van Thaden et 
al., 2006; Waring, 2005).  
These components determine the existence of a blame or just culture, which in turn 
influences the reporting of errors. Reporting errors enables organizational learning 
(Drupsteen et al., 2013). Blame culture can be a barrier for employees of health care 
institutions to report adverse events (Waring, 2005). When errors are not reported, learning 
from previous errors and improving patient safety is inhibited (Khatri et al., 2009). In a just 
culture, errors can be reported (Khatri et al., 2009). Kirk, Parker, Claridge, Esmail, and 
Marshall (2007) state that a just culture should include communication on safety issues and 
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staff training and education in patient safety. It is also clear in a just culture what is or is not 
acceptable behavior (Von Thaden, Hoppes, Li, Johnson & Schriver, 2006). 
Leadership style and just/blame culture in health care settings.    
 The relation between leadership style and just/blame culture. McFadden, 
Henagan and Gowen (2009) state that increasing patient safety depends on the top 
management of the organization. They argue that a blame free, safe environment stems from 
leaders that listen to and care about patient safety concerns. Khatri et al. (2009) name a 
control-based and rule-oriented management style as an influencing factor on the existence 
of a blame culture in hospitals. Against this, a commitment-based management supports 
learning and motivates employees, which supports a just culture. Henriksen and Dayton 
(2006) predict that leadership conditions where errors can be discussed, will lead to an 
increase in reporting errors, which promotes organizational learning. A leader who usually 
seeks blame and attributes failing to individual error, raises fear of punishment, which 
decreases the reporting of errors.   
 The style of leadership has been found to correlate with a culture of patient safety 
(Clarke, 2013; Squires, Tourangeau, Spence Laschinger & Doran, 2010) and blame culture 
(Merril, 2015). The transformational-transactional leadership model states that there are 
three types of leadership styles: transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire (Bass, 
1990). This study focused on transactional and transformational leadership and the 
relationship between these types of leadership and just/blame culture.  
 Transactional leadership. Transactional leadership is characterized by a transaction 
between the employee and the employer (Bass, 1990), and is hierarchical in nature (Gluck, 
2010). An employee is motivated by rewards or penalties the leader can give. Organizational 
learning is promoted by transactional leadership, but organizational learning with a 
transactional leader mainly focuses on the learning that reinforces the existing process, not 
on changing or challenging the current process (Vera & Crossan, 2004).  
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 There are two different types of transactional leaders: contingent reward, and active 
and passive management by exception (Bass, 1990; Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Contingent 
reward refers to the extent to which a leader is clear about his/her expectations and the 
reward set for meeting those expectations. Management by exception is whether the leader 
takes corrective action towards the follower, when it is necessary. Active management by 
exception is characterized by monitoring the situation and taking corrective actions 
immediately. A passive management by exception style is characterized by the leader only 
taking action when behavior is causing problems (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Transactional 
leadership is associated with safety compliance, i.e. following the regulations and rules 
(Clarke, 2013).  
 Transformational leadership. Transformational leaders motivate employees to 
broaden their interests, generate awareness and inspire employees to look beyond their own 
interests. A transformational leader promotes organizational learning in a way that 
challenges the current practice and promotes change (Vera & Crossan, 2004).  
 There are four dimensions in transformational leadership: charisma or idealized 
influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration 
(Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Charisma or idealized influence means the extent to which a leader 
behaves in a way that causes people to identify themselves with the leader. Inspirational 
motivation is the whether the leader has a vision that is appealing and inspiring. Intellectual 
stimulation is the degree in which the leader stimulates the people intellectually by asking 
critical questions, taking risks and by listening to his/her followers’ ideas. Individualized 
consideration means to extent to which a leader listens to concerns and needs, and acts as a 
mentor to his/her follower (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).  
  Transformational leadership is characterized by safety participation, i.e. partaking in 
safety activities (Clarke, 2013). This leadership style is also associated with a lower number 
of adverse events and patient mortality compared to other leadership styles (Wong, 
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Cummings & Ducharme, 2013). Transformational leadership is also associated with low 
turnover, leads to staff stability and helps to increase staff expertise. This leads to better 
outcomes for the patients (Capuano, Bokovoy, Hitchings & Houser, 2005; Houser, 2003).  
 As stated before, transformational leadership is positively correlated with 
organizational learning in healthcare settings (Amitay et al., 2005; LeBrasseur et al., 2002). 
Transactional leadership is also related to organizational learning, but the way transactional 
and transformational leaders promote organizational learning differs (Vera & Crossan, 
2004). Organizational learning is positively related to a just culture in healthcare settings 
(Khatri et al., 2009). This brings into question whether a just culture is correlated with the 
style of leadership in healthcare settings. 
Hypotheses            
 As stated earlier, there is no existing questionnaire that can be used to assess the 
existence of a just and/or blame culture in health care institutions and the influence of 
leadership on just and/or blame culture. In this study, a recently developed questionnaire was 
used. Because this questionnaire has not been used in healthcare settings before, the first 
hypothesis (1A) is about the construct validity of the just/blame culture questionnaire. 
Hypothesis 1B focuses on the internal validity of the leadership style questionnaire, when it 
is used in hospitals, as there has been no previous research with the MLQ-24 in health care 
settings.           
 There is some research that states that leadership style could have an influence on the 
existing just or blame culture in a health care institution. However, there is no solid evidence 
of a relationship between leadership style and just/blame culture in hospitals and it is not 
clear how leadership style exactly influences just/blame culture. Therefore, the other 
question posed in this study is: is there a relation between leadership style and the existence 
of (components of) just or blame culture in hospitals? This leads to four hypotheses (2A, 2B, 
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2C, and 2D) about the relation between leadership and constructs of just/blame culture in 
hospitals.  
 
Hypothesis 1 – the questionnaire  
a. The constructs of the just/blame culture questionnaire are constructually valid when 
used in hospitals. 
b. The leadership questionnaire is a constructually valid predictor of leadership style 
when used in hospitals. 
Hypothesis 2 – leadership and blame culture 
a. There is a relation between the score on the leadership questionnaire and the 
just/blame culture questionnaire, when measured in hospitals. 
b. There is a relation between just/blame culture and transactional leadership, in 
hospitals. 
c. There is a relation between just/blame culture and transformational leadership in 
hospitals. 
d. There is a difference between the scores on the separate constructs on the just/blame 
culture questionnaire in people with a transformational leader and people with a 
transactional leader. 
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Method 
Design            
 The research questions were answered by conducting a survey amongst employees in 
healthcare settings. The design of the study was cross-sectional. This means that the 
participants were not be influenced during the study and the questionnaire was filled out at 
one specific point in time (Field, 2013).   
Procedure           
 Participants were recruited through posts on social media, which included a link to 
the questionnaire. First, participants read and signed an informed consent form. When they 
gave their consent to participate in the study, the questionnaire started automatically. The 
questionnaire took approximately fifteen minutes to fill out and it could be filled out online 
with the program Qualtrics.  
Participants            
 The questionnaire was filled out by 131 employees at healthcare settings. The 
participants were at least 18 years old and an employee or intern at a hospital in the 
Netherlands. The aim was to have at least a hundred participants, but it was preferable to 
have more participants, because of the use of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis 
that was used in this study. It is recommend to have a sample size of at least a hundred 
participants for this type of analysis (Williams, Onsman & Brown, 2010). The participants 
were be recruited through posts on social media, like Facebook. Five participants could win 
a €20,- gift certificate for filling out the questionnaire.  
Materials            
 The questionnaire used in this study consisted of two parts, a questionnaire about 
just/blame culture and a questionnaire about leadership style, the Multifactor Leadership 
Questionnaire (MLQ-24). The questionnaire started with several background questions about 
their position in the hospital and a block of questions especially for interns and a block of 
questions for other hospital employees. The block of questions for hospital employees 
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included questions about their educational level, their position at the hospital and how many 
years of experience they had working in health care. The block of questions for interns 
focused on which internship they were doing presently.    
 Blame culture questionnaire. The questionnaire was developed for a previous 
master thesis and was based on a literature review concerning just and blame culture. It is a 
compilation of several questionnaires on aspects of blame culture. The questionnaire was not 
developed for the use in healthcare specifically. For the purpose of this study, the 
questionnaire was adapted to suit just/blame culture research in health care institutions. 
While adapting the questionnaire to be suitable for healthcare institutions, a check was done 
to see if the questionnaire had face validity. Items that did not seem to relevant for the study 
of just/blame culture in healthcare were deleted. The questions were answered with a seven 
point Likert-scale from ‘strongly disagree to ‘strongly agree’. Also, ‘I do not know’ and 
‘does not apply’ were included as options.      
 The questionnaire consisted of eight constructs: behavior, perception, feelings, 
education, blame culture, other aspects, reporting and the safety@corebusiness 
questionnaire. The behavior, perception and feelings scales consist of three subscales: 
behavior consists of reporting, learning and speaking up; perception consists of management, 
openness and honesty; and feelings consists of psychological safety, trust and fear. The 
safety@corebusiness scale consisted of questions of the ‘Priority for Safety’, ‘Leadership 
consistency’, ‘Leading by Example’, and the ‘Managerial Work Floor Knowledge’ of the 
complete safety@corebusiness questionnaire. The just/blame culture questionnaire and the 
MLQ-24 can be found in appendix A.  
 MLQ-24. The Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) was developed by Bass 
and Avolio (1990), based on Bass’ research on transactional and transformational leadership. 
Tepper and Percy (1994) developed a 24 item version of the MLQ (MLQ-24). In this study, 
16 
 
the MLQ-24 was included, as it was shorter than the regular MLQ and could be used to 
predict transactional and transformational leadership (Tepper & Percy, 1994).    
The MLQ-24 consists of eight scales, four of which that predict transactional leadership and 
four of which that predict transformational leadership. The four scales for transactional 
leadership are split into two contingent reward scales, one for promises and one for rewards, 
and two management-by-exception scales, one for passive and one for active management-
by-exception. The transformational leadership scales were charismatic leadership, 
inspirational leadership, individualized consideration and intellectual stimulation (Tepper & 
Percy, 1994). The MLQ-24 was translated from English to Dutch for this study.    
 The MLQ-24 did not have a cutoff score to decide if somebody has a 
transformational or a transactional leader. Therefore, people were divided into the group 
with a transformational leader or the group with a transactional leader based on what he or 
she had experienced the most. Thus, people with a higher score on subscale of 
transformational leadership were in the transformational leadership group and people with a 
higher score on the transactional leadership subscale were in the transactional leadership 
group. People who had the same score on both subscales were excluded from the analysis.  
Statistical analysis           
  In order to test the hypotheses in this study, the statistical computer programs SPSS 
23 and R were used. The variables were treated as interval variables, as all the questions in 
the questionnaire could be answered with a Likert scale. Thus, the variables could be treated 
as interval variables (Field, 2013).       
 Before the hypotheses were tested, the just/blame culture questionnaire and the 
MLQ-24 were tested on reliability and inter item correlations were calculated. Also, an 
exploratory factor analysis was used to see which underlying structure exists in the 
questionnaire (Williams et al., 2010). Based on these analyses, the just/blame culture 
questionnaire was adjusted. 
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 To test hypothesis 1a and 1b, confirmatory factor analysis was used. The model 
based on hypothesis 1a assumed that the latent variable behind the questions in the 
just/blame culture constructs was just/blame culture. To test this model, a confirmatory 
factor analysis was used (Williams et al., 2010). First of all, a factor analysis was done to test 
whether the latent variable behind these questions was indeed just/blame culture. The 
following constructs were tested separately: blame culture, behavior, perception on 
management, openness and honesty, feelings (psychological safety, trust and fear), 
education, and the safety@corebusiness scale (figure 3). After testing these constructs, a 
factor score per construct was calculated. This factor score was used to test whether blame 
culture is the latent variable behind the constructs of the just/blame culture questionnaire. 
This was done, instead of testing the complete model (figure 3), because the number of 
participants was too low to test the complete model all at once. 
 
Figure 3. Just/blame culture as a latent variable behind the separate constructs in the questionnaire 
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Hypothesis 1b stated that the MLQ-24 was constructually valid to test whether 
someone works for a transactional (TA) and transformational (TF) leader in a hospital. The 
model assumes that transactional and transformational leadership are latent variables behind 
the questions in the MLQ-24.  
 
Figure 4. TF and TA leadership as latent variables behind the questions in the MLQ.    
 
To check whether the proposed model was correct, the model was tested with a chi-square 
test and the fit indices of the model. The comparative fit index (CFI), normed fit index 
(NFI), the non-normed fit index (NNFI), and the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) was checked. A score below .95 on the CFI, and below .90 on the NFI and the 
NNFI meant that the model did not have a sufficient fit on the data. The score on the 
RMSEA below .05 meant the data have an excellent fit, between .05 and .08 meant a good 
fit, and between .08 and.10 meant that the model has a sufficient fit. A score above .10 on 
the RMSEA meant that the model does not have a sufficient fit to the data (Brown, 2015).  
Hypothesis 2a posed the question whether just/blame culture is related to leadership 
in general. Hypothesis 2b and 2c focused on the relation between blame/just culture and 
transactional leadership and transformational leadership. Hypothesis 2d tested the 
relationship between just/blame culture and the separate constructs of the just/blame culture 
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questionnaire. To test hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c, simple linear regression analysis was used 
to determine the relationship between leadership and just/blame culture. To see whether 
leadership style can be used as a predictor for the score on the just/blame culture 
questionnaire. Just/blame culture was used as the dependent variable and leadership was the 
independent variable. A linear regression analysis was done. First, the assumptions of 
standard multiple regression (linearity, normality, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity) 
were checked. To test whether just/blame culture can be predicted by leadership style, an 
ANOVA was used. It was assumed that α < .05 on the F-test in the ANOVA meant that 
leadership style was a useful predictor for the existence of a just/blame culture. The multiple 
correlation coefficient (R)
 
was used to check the usefulness of leadership style as a predictor 
for just/blame culture. R
2
 was used to determine the amount of variance in the just/blame 
outcome that is explained by leadership style (Field, 2013).        
 To test hypothesis 2d, the participants were divided in groups, depending on whether 
they experience more transactional or a transformational leadership from their leader. An 
ANOVA was conducted to measure the differences in these groups on the subscales of the 
just/blame culture questionnaire. The assumptions of a one-way ANOVA were checked, i.e. 
homogeneity of the variances and normality of variances. There is no check for the third 
assumption of ANOVA, the independence of variances, it is a matter of a good study design 
(Field, 2013).      
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Results 
Participants 
The questionnaire was filled out by 131 participants. Table one shows a detailed overview of 
the characteristics of the participants. Of the 131 participants, 57 worked as an intern, 15 as a 
doctor, 8 as a physician assistant, 23 as a nurse, and 28 in other fields. The participants were 
employed at several different departments in hospitals, namely: cardiology, surgery, 
gynecology, hematology, general practitioner, intensive care, internal care, pediatrics, 
otorhinolaryngology, pulmonology, gastroenterology, nephrology, neurology, 
ophthalmology, plastic surgery, psychiatry, radiology, emergency care.   
Table 1 Characteristics of the participants  
 Males    Females    Complete group  
 (n = 30)    (n = 101)   (n = 131) 
 M SD Range   M SD Range  M SDRange 
Age  32.57 10.54 19-58  28.35 10.49 19-64  29.31 10.61 19-64 
HC 13.10 11.67 2-40  11.72 11.21 0-43  12.09 11.27 0-43 
HC = number of years working in healthcare 
 
Reliability of the questionnaires         
 MLQ-24. The MLQ-24 had a Cronbach’s α of .917, which means the reliability is 
considered good. Table two shows the descriptive statistics of the MLQ-24 and its subscales. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were not significant for the complete questionnaire and the 
transformational leadership subscale. Therefore, it can be assumed that the population 
distribution in this scale and these subscales was normal. This is also in line with the 
skewness and/or kurtosis of the scales. The Kolgomorov-Smirnov test for the 
transformational leadership subscale was significant.  
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Table 2 Descriptives of the MLQ-24  
    α items  n M SD Kurtosis Sk KST 
Complete questionnaire .917 24 98 2.923 .628 -.654 -.099 .071 
Transactional leadership .803 12 98 3.002 .600 -.242 -.133 .068 
Transformational leadership .875 12 98 2.837 .816 1.293 .672 .063* 
* p = < .05, ** p = < .01, *** p = <.001 
 
Just/blame culture questionnaire. The questionnaire had a Cronbach’s α of .763, 
which is considered reliable, but the separate constructs of the questionnaire were not 
reliable (see table three). Listwise deletion was used to exclude participants when calculating 
the reliability. The reliability of the constructs and sub-constructs can be seen in table three. 
The reliability if item deleted presented that the removal of some items could increase 
reliability.  
Table 3 Cronbach’s alpha just/blame culture questionnaire  
    n  α  α without items  
Complete questionnaire 32  .707 
Behavior   53  .440  .722 (R3, L5, SU2) 
 reporting (R)  66  .196  .546 (R3) 
 learning (L)  70  .374  .636 (L5) 
 speaking up (SU) 108  -.052  .385 (SU2) 
Perceptions   61  .487  .547 (M3 and Fa3) 
 management (M) 95  .687  .705 (M3) 
 openness (O)  99  .864 
 fairness (Fa)  67  .465  .799 (Fa3) 
Feelings   79  .506  .611 (PS4, T3 and F3) 
 psych. safety (PS) 94  .413  .680 (PS4) 
 trust (T)  92  .529  .843 (T3) 
 fear (Fe)  102  .471  .727 (F3) 
Education   115  .910 
Blame culture   84  .870 
Other aspects   77  .363 
Safety@corebusiness  104  .920 
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Factor analysis. Inspection of the questionnaire showed some items did not seem to fit in 
the construct they were placed in, but they could still provide useful information. Therefore, 
instead of deleting the items, a principal component analysis was conducted to see whether 
items could be moved to other scales.  
 The sample size was considered too small to perform a factor analysis (N = 131). 
However, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was .803, which meant that the data had a clear 
factor structure, and that a principal component analysis could be done despite the small 
sample size. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (df = 1431) = 3950.721, p < .001). 
It could be assumed that the correlations between variables were not zero. As both of these 
assumptions were met, a principal component analysis could be conducted.    
The unrotated solution was used, which showed sixteen components with an 
eigenvalue higher than one. Based on the scree plot, the solution could have one or five 
components (appendix B, figure B1). The components generated by the principal component 
analysis consisted of items of several different scales. The first component mainly included 
questions of the openness, fairness, psychological safety, trust, speaking up and learning 
scale. The second component was composed of questions mostly from the management and 
the fear scale. The third component mainly consisted of questions from the education scale. 
The fourth component included questions from the speaking up, learning, openness, 
psychological safety and trust scales. The fifth component only included two questions of the 
learning scale.           
 The scales of the questionnaire were adjusted, based on the principal component 
analysis and the reliability analysis. This provided a general idea of the new structure of the 
questionnaire. The questions eligible for moving to another scale were checked on content 
and their fit with the other questions in the scale. Eight items were moved to another scale, 
as can be seen in table four. The item reporting 4 (‘Incidents and/or calamities that occur in 
my team/department, are reported by others.’) was deleted from the questionnaire, as this 
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item did not seem to fit to any of the scales according to the factor and reliability analyses. 
These measures improved the reliability of all the scales, except for the scales perceptions (α 
= .254) and feelings (α = .599). This lead to the assumption that these subscales did not fit 
together in a scale. Based on the content of the items and the principal component analysis, 
two new scales were formed: ‘fear of consequences’ and ‘atmosphere’. Atmosphere 
consisted of the subscales trust, openness, fairness, and some items of psychological safety. 
Fear of consequences consisted of the subscales management, fear and some items of other 
aspects and psychological safety. The items of the other aspects scale that were left, were 
distributed over several scales, based on the content and the principal component analysis. 
Item four of other aspects was removed from the questionnaire. The final version of the 
questionnaire can be seen in table three. A description of the moved and deleted items can be 
found in appendix C. Table four shows the Cronbach’s alpha of the adjusted just/blame 
culture questionnaire.  
 Mean substitution was used to substitute missing values, except in cases where less 
than 50% of the questions in a (sub)construct were completed. In that case, the participant 
was not used in the calculation of reliability of that construct.  
Table 4 Cronbach’s alpha on the final version of the just/blame culture questionnaire  
    α  n items moved items added 
Complete questionnaire .706  89 
Behavior    .873  125 
 reporting (R)  .700  103 R3  
 learning (L)  .797  121 L5   PS2, PS5, OA6, OA8 
 speaking up (SU) .799  116 SU2, SU5 
Fear of consequences  .862  128   
management (M) .792   126   SU5, L5, F3, T3, OA4 
fear (FE)  .817  125 FE3  R3, PS4, SU2, OA5,OA7 
Atmosphere  .933  123 
 trust (T)  .887  118 T3  OA1, OA2 
 openness (O)  .882  119   PS1, PS3, OA3 
 fairness (FA)  .803   119 FA3   F3 
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Education   .910  121 
Blame culture   .870  101 
Safety@corebusiness  .920  104 
 
Table five shows the final descriptive measures of the just/blame culture questionnaire. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were significant for the behavior scale and its subscales, the 
subscales trust and fairness, the blame culture scale and the safety@corebusiness scale. 
Therefore, it was assumed that the population distribution in this scale and these subscales 
was not normal. This is also in line with the skewness and kurtosis of the scales.  
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the just/blame culture questionnaire  
   α items  n M SD Sk Kurtosis KST 
Behavior         .873   14 125 5.019 .834 -.823 2.420  .106* 
   reporting (R) .700   3 103 5.343 1.064 -1.126 1.587       .150*** 
   learning (L)  .797 8 121 5.137 .851 -.977 3.208  .099* 
   speaking up (SU) .799 3 116 4.690 1.294 -.489 -.059  .099* 
Fear of consequences .857 19 128 3.363 .872 .019 -.067  .066 
   management (M)  .758 10 126 3.454 .867 -.194 .216  .056 
   fear (Fe)     .817 9 125 3.256 1.065 .387 -.210  .077 
Atmosphere      .933 19 123 5.507 .852 -.100 2.011  .073 
   trust (T)     .874 6  118 5.869 .840 -1.281 2.220  .105* 
   openness (O) .890  8 119 5.222 1.001 -.847 .919  .087 
   fairness (Fa)  .756 5 119 5.525 .893 -1.108 2.243        .109** 
Education          .910 6 121 4.407 1.396 -.385 -.489  .085 
Blame culture   .870 5 101 2.319 .969 .630 -.152       .130** 
Safety@corebusiness .920 14 104 3.873 .070 -.275 .565      .124*** 
* p = < .05, ** p = < .01, *** p = <.001 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 Hypothesis 1A. The question posed in hypothesis 1A was whether the blame culture 
constructs of the questionnaire are constructually valid when the questionnaire is used in 
hospitals. To test this hypothesis, the separate constructs of the questionnaire, i.e. behavior, 
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perception, feelings, education, blame culture, and safety@corebusiness, were tested with a 
confirmatory factor analysis in the statistical program R. This way, it could be confirmed 
that what was intended to be measured by this construct, was indeed the latent variable 
behind this construct. This would mean that the construct was constructually valid. Then, a 
factor score per construct was calculated. With these factor scores, a confirmatory factor 
analysis could be done to test the construct validity of the complete questionnaire.  
 First, a confirmatory factor analysis was done on the scales of the original just/blame 
culture questionnaire. Afterwards, a confirmatory factor analysis was done on the adjusted 
just/blame culture questionnaire, to ensure that it was possible to compare the fit of the 
model to the data on the original questionnaire and the adjusted questionnaire. Table six 
shows the results of the confirmatory factor analyses done on the separate constructs of the 
just/blame culture questionnaire before it was adjusted. Table seven shows the results of the 
confirmatory factor analysis after the adjustment of the questionnaire.  
 Deletion based on maximum likelihood was used to ensure the highest possible 
amount of usable data. The group of participants needed to be at least a hundred to be able to 
do a factor analysis (Williams et al., 2010). As can be seen in table six and seven, the 
number of participants differed for the separate constructs.  
 Table six shows that the constructs behavior, perception, feelings, education, 
safety@corebusiness do not have a sufficient fit on the data on any of the fit indices. The 
CFI was below .95 in all cases, the NFI and NNFI below .90, and RMSEA above .10. Blame 
culture did have a sufficient fit according to the NFI, but not according to the CFI, NNFI and 
RMSEA. Other aspects was sufficient according to the CFI, NNFI, and the RMSEA, but not 
according to the NFI.            
 Another confirmatory factor analysis was done on the adjusted constructs of the 
questionnaire. Table seven shows that the transformed version of the questionnaire has a 
better, albeit still not sufficient fit to the data, Behavior still does not have a sufficient fit, but 
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the scores on the CFI, NFI and NNFI are slightly higher, which means the data was closer to 
having a sufficient fit. The RMSEA was slightly too high for a sufficient fit. Fear of 
consequences did not have a sufficient fit according to the CFI, NFI and NNFI, but did have 
a sufficient fit according to the RMSEA. Education, safety@corebusiness and blame culture 
were not adjusted, thus the fit of the model was the same as in table six.    
Table 6 Confirmatory factor analysis fit indices Just/Blame culture questionnaire  
    n CFI  NFI  NNFI  RMSEA 
Behavior   119 .692  .585  .640  .112*** 
Perception   119 .699  .622  .649  .135*** 
Feelings   118 .753  .677  .712  .131*** 
Education   121 .900  .884  .833  .204*** 
Safety@corebusiness  104 .725  .673  .675  .176*** 
Blame culture   101 .940  .923  .880  .174*** 
Other aspects   106 .955  .899  .937  .081 
* p = < .05, ** p = < .01, *** p = <.001 
 
Table 7 Confirmatory factor analysis adjusted Just/Blame culture questionnaire  
    n CFI  NFI  NNFI  RMSEA 
Behavior   125 .732  .627  .683  .107*** 
Fear of consequences  128 .724  .595  .689  .095*** 
Atmosphere   123 .783  .709  .756  .127*** 
Education   121 .900  .884  .833  .204*** 
Safety@corebusiness  104 .725  .673  .675  .176*** 
Blame culture   101 .940  .923  .880  .174*** 
Just/blame model  121 .877  .833  .795  .130* 
* p = < .05, ** p = < .01, *** p = <.001 
 
The factor scores of the adjusted constructs were calculated. With these factor scores, a 
new confirmatory factor analysis was done to test whether the latent variable behind the 
separate constructs was indeed just/blame culture. Exclusion based on maximum likelihood 
was used again. The fit indices indicate that the model does not have a good fit to the data, as 
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can be seen in table seven. This means that the model as seen in figure three does not fit the 
data. This did not mean that just/blame culture is not the latent variable behind the constructs 
of the questionnaire. The proposed model was close to having a sufficient fit, which is above 
.95, .90 and below .10 on respectively the CFI, NFI, NNFI and the RMSEA. This means that 
the proposed model did approach just/blame culture, but it did not represent just/blame 
culture completely. Figure four shows the current, incomplete model of just/blame culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Just/blame culture model 
Hypothesis 1B. The leadership questionnaire is a constructually valid predictor of 
leadership style when used in hospitals. To test this hypothesis, the constructs of 
transactional and transformational leadership of the questionnaire was tested with a 
confirmatory factor analysis. This way, it can be confirmed that the questions per construct 
all fit to the said construct and that the latent variable behind the questions is indeed 
transformational or transactional leadership. As in the analysis of hypothesis 1A, exclusion 
of participants based on maximum likelihood was done. This resulted in a hundred 
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participants that were included in the analysis. The fit indices of the confirmatory factor 
analysis show that the proposed model does not have a sufficient fit to the data. The CFI, 
NFI, NNFI and RMSEA respectively had .483, .389, .434, and .135. None of these fit indices 
suggest a good fit to the data. This means that the proposed model as can be seen in figure 
four does not fit the data.  
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2A. The question posed in hypothesis 2A was whether there is a relation 
between the score on the leadership questionnaire and the just/blame culture questionnaire, 
when the score was measured in hospitals. To answer this question, a simple linear 
regression was used. A new variable for the total mean score on the just/blame culture 
questionnaire was calculated. This variable consisted of the mean scores on the subscales 
management, fear, reporting, learning, speaking up, openness, fairness, trust, and the scales 
blame and safety@corebusiness. A total score could give misleading results, as some 
subscales consisted of more questions than other subscales, which would give some 
subscales more weight compared to the other subscales. Therefore, a total mean score was 
calculated. After the calculation of the new variable, a simple linear regression could be 
done. The total mean score on the just/blame culture questionnaire is the dependent variable 
and the mean score on the MLQ-24 is the independent variable.    
 First, the linearity, normality, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity assumptions of 
simple linear regression were checked. The assumptions were not violated, so the simple 
linear regression could be done. Participants were excluded pairwise. Because of the 
deletion, data of 89 of the participants could be used for the simple regression analysis. The 
ANOVA of the regression was significant (F (df = 1, 87) = 6.976, p = .010). This means that 
the score on the leadership style questionnaire is a significant, positive predictor of the score 
on the just/blame culture questionnaire. The R
2 
was .074, which means that 7.4% of the 
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variance in the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire, could be predicted from the 
score on the leadership style questionnaire.  
 Hypothesis 2B. Hypothesis 2B focused on the relationship between the score on the 
just/blame culture questionnaire and the score on items about transactional leadership style.  
First, the linearity, normality, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity assumptions of simple 
linear regression were checked. The assumptions were not violated, so a simple linear 
regression could be done. Participants were excluded on a pairwise basis, as a result, data of 
89 participants was included. The ANOVA was not significant (F (df = 1, 87) = 2.806, p = 
.098). This meant that the score on transactional leadership is not a significant predictor of 
the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire. R
2 
was .031, which means that 3.1% of the 
variance in the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire, can be predicted from the score 
on scale for transactional leadership style.  
 Hypothesis 2C. The question posed in hypothesis 2C was whether this population 
shows a relationship between the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire and the score 
on items on transformational leadership style. The score on the just/blame culture 
questionnaire was used as the dependent variable and leadership style is the independent 
variable. Before a simple linear regression could be done, the assumptions were checked. 
The assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity and multicollinearity were not violated. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was significant, which means the data was not normally 
distributed, so the assumption of normality was violated. However, the normal P-P plot 
shows no alarming deviations from the normal distribution (Appendix B, figure B2). Thus, 
even though the assumption of normality was violated, a simple linear regression could be 
done.  
 Participants were excluded from the regression analysis on a pairwise basis. The data 
of 89 participants could be used. The ANOVA was significant (F (df = 1, 87) = 10.115, p = 
.002). This meant that the score on transformational leadership was a significant, positive 
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predictor of the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire. R
2 
was .104, which meant that 
10.4% of the variance in the dependent variable, the score on the just/blame culture 
questionnaire, could be predicted from the score on scale for transformational leadership 
style.  
Hypothesis 2D. Hypothesis 2D states that there is a difference between the scores on 
the separate constructs on the just/blame culture questionnaire in people with a 
transformational leader and people with a transactional leader. To test this hypothesis, a one 
way ANOVA was done. First, the assumptions of the ANOVA were checked. Levene’s test 
of homogeneity of variances was not significant in any of the constructs, except behavior 
and its sub-construct learning. This means that the variances were not significantly different 
in the group with a transformational leader and in the group with a transactional leader. The 
variances in the behavior construct and the learning sub-construct were significantly 
different between the two groups, so the Welch F-value should be interpreted instead of the 
regular F-value for this construct and sub-construct. The normality of the variances was also 
checked. The P-P plots of the variances showed no systematic deviation from normality (see 
appendix B, figure B2). After checking the assumptions, an ANOVA was conducted. The 
participants were excluded analysis by analysis. The results of this ANOVA can be seen in 
table eight. 
Table 8 ANOVA score just/blame culture transformational/transactional leadership  
   nTF nTA F  df  p   
Complete question. 67 18 3.662  1, 83  .059   
Behavior  76 20 1.858  1, 22.913 .186   
 Learning 75 20 2.892  1, 22.795 .103 
 Reporting  69 18 .116  1, 84  .734 
 Speaking up 76 20 2.595  1, 94  .111 
Fear of consequences 76 20 3.662  1, 94  .060 
 Management 76 20 3.714  1, 94  .057 
 Fear  76 20 2.481  1, 94  .119 
Atmosphere  76 20 9.289  1, 94  .003 
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 Openness 76 20 6.410  1, 94  .013 
 Fairness 76 20 6.618  1, 94  .012 
 Trust  76 20 9.957  1, 94  .002  
Education  75 20 .001  1, 93  .980 
Safety@corebusiness 76 20 18.817  1, 94  .001 
Blame culture  72 19 1.180  1, 89  .280  
 
There was no significant difference between the transactional and the 
transformational groups on the complete questionnaire, the behavior and fear of 
consequences constructs and their sub-constructs, the education construct and the blame 
construct. The score on atmosphere construct and its sub-constructs, and the 
safety@corebusiness differed significantly between the transactional and the 
transformational group. The transformational group had a higher mean on the construct 
atmosphere (MTF = 5.707, SDTF = .695 and MTA = 5.129, SDTA = .951) and the sub-constructs 
trust (MTF = 6.076, SDTF = .646 and MTA = 5.496, SDTA = 1.001), openness (MTF = 5.432, 
SDTF = .871 and MTA =4.843, SDTA = 1.111) and fairness (MTF = 5.688, SDTF = .792 and MTA 
= 5.148, SDTA = .989). The transformational group had a higher mean on the 
safety@corebusiness scale (MTF = 4.001, SDTF = .656 and MTA = 3.446, SDTA = .715).  
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Discussion 
This study tested the construct validity and reliability of the recently developed just/blame 
culture questionnaire and the MLQ-24 in healthcare institutions. It also examined the 
relationship between the existence of just/blame culture and leadership style. 
Construct validity of the just/blame culture questionnaire. The first hypothesis (1A) 
stated that the just/blame culture questionnaire was constructually valid, when it was used in 
healthcare institutions. The results did not support this hypothesis. After transformation of 
the questionnaire, the questionnaire came closer to being constructually valid, but the 
hypothesis could still not be supported. This could be explained by several factors. First, this 
questionnaire was not tested on validity before and is still in its testing phase. Thus, it needs 
to be adjusted and tested again. Second, the number of participants was considered too low 
to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis on the entire questionnaire. The questionnaire had 
to be tested per construct and the complete questionnaire was tested based on factor scores 
per construct. Third, it is possible that the proposed model of just/blame culture (figure 2) 
does not represent just/blame culture completely. The reliability of the complete 
questionnaire was considered good, which means that the questionnaire was internally 
consistent. This shows that complete questionnaire does seem to measure the same concept, 
but it did not capture the exact components of what just/blame culture is. The questionnaire 
was based on the most recent literature on just/blame culture. This leads to the idea that the 
current research available now does not completely grasp what just/blame culture is. It is 
clear, however, that just/blame culture consists of different factors and that behavior, fear of 
consequences, atmosphere, and education do play a role in the existence of a just/blame 
culture. There might be other factors that were not mentioned in current research that also 
play a role in just/blame culture. The interaction between team members could be one of 
those other factors. Instead of focusing solely on the influence a manager can have on its 
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team, the influence team members can have on each other also needs to be taken into 
account.   
Construct validity of the MLQ-24. Hypothesis 1B stated that the MLQ-24 was 
constructually valid when it was used in a healthcare institution. This hypothesis was not 
supported by the results. This was unexpected, because Tepper and Percy (1994) stated that 
this questionnaire could be used to measure transformational and transactional leadership. 
Also, the complete questionnaire and the constructs for transactional and transformational 
leadership were reliable. This means that the questionnaire and the constructs were internally 
consistent, but the factor scores do not support the proposed model on leadership (figure 4). 
Research by Judge and Piccolo (2004) provides a possible explanation for this finding. They 
found that transactional and transformational leadership show a high level of correlation, 
especially between contingent reward and transformational leadership. 
Leadership style and just/blame culture. The second hypothesis examined the relationship 
between the existence of a just/blame culture and the style of leadership in a healthcare 
institution. Merrill (2015) stated that the style of leadership influences patient safety and can 
lead to a culture of blame. Khatri et al. (2009) theorizes that management also influences 
blame culture. However, previous studies have not found scientific evidence of a relation 
between transformational and transactional leadership styles and blame culture. Hypothesis 
2A stated that a relationship between the score on the leadership questionnaire and the 
just/blame culture questionnaire was expected. The results show that there is indeed a 
relation, leadership style is a positive predictor for the score on the just/blame culture 
questionnaire. This is in accordance with previous literature on just/blame culture (Henagan 
& Gowen, 2009; Henriksen & Dayton, 2006; Khatri et al., 2009; Merril, 2015). Leadership 
style predicted 7.4% of the variance in the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire. This 
points to the fact that leadership style is a predictor of just/blame culture, but it plays a small 
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role. As stated before, it is probable that there are other factors that influence just/blame 
culture that have not been taken into account yet.  
Factors that have not been taken into account are the behavior of the team, the 
interaction between the leader and the team, and the interaction between team members. The 
leader has an influence on the culture within a team, but the members of the team could also 
play an important role in influencing their own team culture.  
 Transactional leadership and just/blame culture. Hypothesis 2B stated that the 
score on the transactional leadership construct of the MLQ-24 is related to the score on the 
just/blame culture questionnaire. The results do not support this hypothesis. The results show 
that the transactional leadership construct is not a significant predictor of just/blame culture 
in a healthcare institution. This is unexpected, as the results of hypothesis 2A show that there 
is a relation between the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire and leadership style. 
This could be, because there is no relation between just/blame culture and transactional 
leadership. In contrast to this, a significant relation between transformational leadership and 
just/blame culture was found.  
 Transformational leadership and just/blame culture. Hypothesis 2C stated that 
the score on the transformational leadership construct of the MLQ-24 is related to the score 
on the just/blame culture questionnaire. The results support this hypothesis. The score on the 
transformational leadership construct is a significant predictor of the score on the just/blame 
culture questionnaire. Transformational leadership predicted 10.4% of the variance in the 
score on the just/blame questionnaire. Thus, transformational leadership is a factor that 
influences just/blame culture, but it is not the only factor of importance.    
It was surprising that the score on the transformational leadership construct had a 
significant relation with the score on the just/blame culture questionnaire, as the score on the 
transactional leadership construct did not. This suggest that there is a relation between 
specific characteristics of transformational leadership and just/blame culture. Judge and 
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Piccolo (2004) state that transactional and transformational leadership show a high level of 
correlation, especially between contingent reward and transformational leadership. They 
hypothesize that leaders can have traits of both transactional and transformational leadership. 
It could be possible that some specific traits of transformational leadership are related to 
just/blame culture, and that the traits measured in the transactional construct are not related 
to just/blame culture. It is not yet clear which traits of transformational leadership are related 
to just/blame culture.  
Leadership style and experience of segments of just/blame culture. Hypothesis 2D stated 
that people with a transactional leader and people with a transformational leader have a 
significantly different score on the separate constructs of the just/blame culture 
questionnaire. This was partly confirmed by the results. The score of the transactional and 
transformational group did not differ significantly on behavior and its sub-constructs 
learning, reporting and speaking up. The non-significant difference between the two groups 
on learning was supported by the research of Vera and Crossan (2004). They state that 
transformational leaders and transactional leaders both support organizational learning, albeit 
in a different way. Transformational leaders promote challenging current practices and 
promote change, whereas transactional leaders promote learning that reinforces the current 
process. The non-significant result on reporting and speaking up were unexpected in relation 
to the significant result on the Atmosphere construct, which will be discussed later.  
 The scores on the fear of consequences construct and its sub-constructs did not differ 
significantly for the two groups. Transactional and transformational leaders differ in their 
style of rewarding employees. A transactional leader motivates the employees with the 
rewards or penalties he or she can give. He or she is also clear about his or her expectations 
and takes corrective action when it is necessary (Bass, 1990). This does not mean that a 
transactional leader punishes unfairly compared to a transformational leader. It could be 
hypothesized that fear depends on the nature of the consequences. A transactional leader 
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might react differently than a transformational leader, but that does not mean that of the 
reactions must be feared. 
 The mean score on the atmosphere construct and its sub-constructs, openness, 
fairness and trust, was significantly higher for the transformational group than the 
transactional group. Edmondson (2004) states that an open, blame-free environment is 
influenced by the leader of a team. The results in this research suggest that a 
transformational leader promotes this open, blame-free environment. It was expected by 
Edmondson (2004) that openness promotes reporting and discussing of adverse events, so 
one would expect a difference in reporting and speaking up between the group who 
experienced more transformational and the group who experienced more transactional 
leadership. Surprisingly, this research did not find such a difference. The reporting and 
speaking up scales did not measure the objective amount of reports on adverse events in a 
department, it measured the ideas one had about reporting and speaking up. The ideas one 
has on reporting and speaking up may not be influenced by his or her leader, but the 
objective amount of reports could be.  
 The score on the education construct did not differ significantly between the two 
groups. This was not unexpected, because the education construct consists of questions on 
someone’s education about the reporting of errors, before he or she started working in his or 
her current position. Thus, the education construct could not be influenced by the leadership 
style of one’s current leader. 
The scores on the blame culture construct did not differ significantly. This was 
unexpected, because previous research suggests a relation between leadership and a blame 
culture in general. This construct was meant to measure blame culture in general. Previous 
research states that leadership is related to a culture of blame (Henagan & Gowen, 2009; 
Henriksen & Dayton, 2006; Khatri et al., 2009; Merril, 2015). It is possible that leadership 
style did not have a relation between blame culture in general. Another explanation is that 
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this construct might not be useable to measure blame culture in general. The items in this 
construct question who gets blamed when a calamity occurs, but blame culture is a much 
broader concept than this.  
 The scores on the safety@corebusiness construct differed significantly between the 
transformational and the transactional group. The group with a transformational leader had a 
higher average score than the transactional group. Clarke (2013) mentions that 
transformational leadership is characterized by safety participation, while transactional 
leadership is characterized by safety compliance. The active participation in safety activities 
is in line with the safety@corebusiness scale ‘Priority for Safety’.  
 As stated earlier, the closeness of the scores on the transactional and transformational 
constructs suggest that people experience characteristics of both transformational and 
transactional leadership. It is clear that people who experienced more transformational 
leadership scored higher on openness, fairness, and trust. However, it is unclear which 
specific characteristics of leadership style have a positive influence on openness, fairness 
and trust. 
Previous research states that leadership style is related to a blame or just culture 
(Henagan & Gowen, 2009; Henriksen & Dayton, 2006; Khatri et al., 2009; Merril, 2015) and 
patient safety (Clarke, 2013; Frankel et al., 2006; Squires et al., 2010). This research adds to 
the pre-existing literature on leadership and just/blame culture that there is indeed a relation 
between leadership styles and just/blame culture, as leadership style is related to the 
constructs openness, fairness and trust components of a just/blame culture. 
Limitations and recommendations for future research 
In this study, a self-report questionnaire was used. Therefore, it is impossible to control for 
socially desirable responses. Also, some respondents filled out only part of the questionnaire. 
This could be due to the length of the questionnaire, as it took approximately twenty minutes 
to complete the questionnaire.  
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 The just/blame culture questionnaire could not be considered constructually valid, 
based on the confirmatory factor analysis. This study suggests that the current model is 
incomplete and that there are other constructs of just/blame culture that need to be taken into 
account. Future research should examine the possibility that there could be other factors that 
influence just/blame culture, e.g. the behavior of the team instead of just the behavior of the 
leader.  The transformed version of the questionnaire needs further adjustment based on the 
analysis in this study and recent developments in just and blame culture research. After 
transformation of the questionnaire, it should be tested again in a healthcare institution. The 
MLQ-24 could not be considered constructually valid either. It is recommended to analyze 
the MLQ-24 in more depth and to re-examine the model of transformational and 
transactional leadership. 
 Also, there was no standard cutoff score for the MLQ-24. It was decided to scale 
participants in the transformational group or transactional group based on if they had the 
highest score on the transformational or transactional scale. The differences between the 
scores on the transformational and transactional items were small in several cases. This 
means that participants experienced characteristics of transformational and transactional 
leadership. This is in line with the high correlation between transformational and 
transactional leadership scales Judge and Piccolo (2004) found.     
 A larger and more heterogeneous test sample is recommended for future research. 
This sample was too small to for some of the used analyses, and the homogeneity of the 
sample makes it hard to generalize the results to a population of healthcare employees. 
Participants in this study were all employed at a healthcare institution or an intern at a 
healthcare institution. Almost 45% of the participants was an intern. This can be explained 
by the way the participants were recruited. Participants were recruited through social media 
and in the personal network of the researchers. The social network of the researchers mainly 
consisted of people who were also students at Leiden University. The homogeneity of the 
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sample makes the results less generalizable for all kinds of healthcare workers. A more 
heterogeneous group would give results that are more generalizable across different types of 
healthcare workers. It is recommended for future research that different types of healthcare 
workers are recruited. 
 The group who experienced more transactional leadership was a lot smaller than the 
group who experienced more transformational leadership. This decreased the statistical 
power of the research on transactional leadership and the differences between 
transformational and transactional leadership. A larger test sample would have solved this 
issue. Statistical power above .80 would have been desirable, but the transactional group and 
the transformational group would both need at least 86 participants.  
 This study was the first to examine the relation between just/blame culture and 
leadership style with a specific just/blame culture questionnaire. The questionnaire was still 
in the test phase in this study. This does not mean that the results are uninterpretable, but 
they need to be interpreted with caution. Also, it is yet unclear which specific characteristics 
of transformational leadership have an effect on openness, fairness, and trust. More research 
is needed to study this relationship and to determine the exact pathway between leadership 
style and just/blame culture. 
 Based on this study, conclusions could not be drawn about the relationship between 
the culture in a hospital, actual amount of reporting of adverse events and patient safety and 
mortality. Future studies could measure just/blame culture and the amount of reports with 
longitudinal research to determine whether just/blame culture actually predicts reporting of 
adverse events and patient safety. 
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Conclusion 
The culture in a hospital can influence reporting of adverse events, which enables 
organizational learning, and thus influences patient safety. The analysis of the just/blame 
culture model showed that the current model is incomplete. The current does seem to include 
certain constructs of a just/blame culture, but it does not seem to grasp just/blame culture 
completely. The just/blame culture model, on which the questionnaire was based, needs to be 
adjusted. The questionnaire also needs to be adjusted accordingly to ensure its validity and 
reliability. It can be an important tool to assess the existence of components of just/blame 
culture, which could play a role in increasing patient safety. 
 Leadership style has a relationship with just/blame culture, and therefore with patient 
safety. Experiencing more transformational or transactional leadership does not seem to 
influence thoughts of healthcare employees about reporting mistakes, but people who 
experience more transactional leadership do feel more openness, fairness and trust. Through 
this pathway, leadership style is related to the existence of a segment of just/blame culture, 
which can be of influence on reporting of mistakes, organizational learning, and thus patient 
safety. More research is necessary to determine the exact relationship between leadership 
style and openness, fairness, and trust, and the reporting and learning from incidents. When 
this relationship is clearer, steps can be taken to promote certain leadership behavior to 
increase patient safety. 
 It can be concluded that just/blame culture plays an important role in patient safety, 
but that is it not clear what just/blame culture exactly is. This thesis provided evidence that 
just/blame culture might go beyond the scope of the current research. More research in the 
field of just/blame culture in health care is necessary to broaden the definition of just/blame 
culture and to discover what can be done to create the best possible hospital culture. This can 
contribute to patient safety and the decrease of preventable adverse events, which will save 
lives in the future. 
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Appendix A. Just/blame culture questionnaire and MLQ-24 
 
Informed consent (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
 
Hartelijk dank dat u aan dit onderzoek wilt deelnemen. 
 
Wij verzoeken u vriendelijk het onderstaande aandachtig door te nemen: 
Dit onderzoek gaat over de relatie tussen just/blame culture, leiderschap en ‘organizational learning’ binnen dit ziekenhuis 
en wordt uitgevoerd door de Universiteit van Leiden, instituut Psychologie, sectie Cognitieve Psychologie. 
 
Deelname aan dit onderzoek duurt ca. 15 minuten, is geheel vrijwillig en kan op elk gewenst moment zonder opgaaf van 
reden worden beëindigd. Onder de deelnemers zullen bol.com cadeaubonnen verloot worden. 
 
Alle informatie die in het kader van dit onderzoek wordt verzameld, zal strikt vertrouwelijk behandeld worden. De 
gegevens worden in anonieme vorm verwerkt en opgeslagen. Tot deze gegevens hebben alleen de direct betrokken 
onderzoekers toegang. De resultaten worden gebruikt in wetenschappelijke publicaties en/of rapportages. Uw persoons-, 
afdelings- en instituutsgegevens zijn daarin niet te herleiden.  
 
Voor eventuele vragen of klachten kunt u een e-mail sturen naar k.m.vanwijk@umail.leidenuniv.nl, 
s.komen@umail.leidenuniv.nl of groeneweg@fsw.leidenuniv.nl. 
 
Verklaart u het bovenstaande te hebben doorgenomen en begrepen, en wilt u deelnemen aan dit 
onderzoek? 
Ja 
Nee 
 
If  Nee Is Selected 
Weet u  zeker dat u niet wilt deelnemen? 
 Ja (uw deelname wordt beëindigd) (1) 
 Nee (doorgaan) (2) 
If Ja (uw deelname wordt beëin... Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey 
 
If Nee (doorgaan) Is Selected , Then back to start  
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Achtergrondvragen (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
 
We beginnen met een aantal achtergrondvragen. Deze worden alleen gebruikt voor statistische doeleinden en kunnen niet 
herleid worden naar uw persoon. 
 
Geslacht 
 Vrouw (1) 
 Man (2) 
 
Leeftijd … 
 
Wat is uw functie? 
 arts  
 verpleegkundige 
 verzorgende 
 co-assistent 
 arts-assistent 
 physician assistant 
 overig 
 
If co-assistent is selected 
Wat is uw huidige of laatst gelopen co-schap? … 
 
Hoe lang loop je al co-schappen? … 
 
De vragen die volgen, zullen gaan over het ziekenhuis waar u het bovengenoemde co-schap hebt gelopen/loopt. 
 
If overig is selected 
Geef aan wat uw functie is. … 
 
If arts, verpleegkundige, verzorgende, arts-assistent of physician assistant is selected 
Hoeveel jaar werkt u al in de zorg?  … 
Hoeveel jaar bekleed u uw huidige functie?... 
Op welke afdeling werkt u? ... 
 
Welke opleiding heeft u gehad voorafgaand aan uw huidige functie? 
 geneeskunde  
 HBO verpleegkunde 
 MBO verpleegkunde 
 MBO verzorging 
 overige opleiding (define…) 
 
Geeft u leiding? 
 Ja (1) 
 Nee (2) 
If Geeft u leiding? Ja Is Selected 
Aan hoeveel personen? … 
Hoe veilig ervaart u het werken in deze instelling?  
NB: hier wordt sociale veiligheid bedoeld, i.e. de cultuur die heerst onder het personeel m.b.t. communicatie, niet zozeer de 
kans op ongevallen. 
 
Vul in: Heel onveilig (- - -) tot Heel veilig (+++) 
 - - - (1) 
 - - (2) 
 - (3) 
 0 (4) 
 + (5) 
 ++ (6) 
 +++ (7) 
 Weet niet (8) 
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Blok 1: Gedrag (Rapporteren, leren en zich uitspreken) (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst)  
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 - - - 
(1) 
- - 
(2) 
- 
(3) 
0 
(4) 
+ 
(5) 
++ 
(6) 
+++ 
(7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling worden de meeste incidenten 
en/of calamiteiten gemeld. (1) 
                  
Mijn direct leidinggevende stimuleert me om incidenten en/of 
calamiteiten te melden. (2) 
                  
Angst voor de eventuele negatieve gevolgen weerhouden mij 
ervan om incidenten en/of calamiteiten te melden. (3) 
                  
Incidenten en/of calamiteiten die zich binnen mijn team/op 
mijn afdeling voordoen, worden door anderen gemeld. (4) 
                  
Incidenten en/of calamiteiten die zich binnen mijn team/op 
mijn afdeling voordoen, worden door diegene zelf gemeld. (5) 
                  
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal 
mee oneens 
(1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal 
mee eens 
(7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling zijn we actief 
bezig om (sociale) veiligheid te vergroten. (1) 
                  
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling hebben eerder 
gemaakte  incidenten en/of calamiteiten tot 
positieve veranderingen geleid. (2) 
                  
Onze procedures zorgen ervoor dat er geen 
fouten gemaakt worden en/of geen incidenten 
voorkomen. (3) 
                  
In mijn team/op mijn afdeling besteden we tijd 
om gemaakte fouten te analyseren en te 
bediscussiëren, zodat ze de volgende keer niet 
meer gebeuren. (4) 
                  
Dezelfde fouten worden steeds opnieuw 
gemaakt, omdat er hier niets verandert. (5) 
                  
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 - - - 
(1) 
- - 
(2) 
- 
(3) 
0 
(4) 
+ 
(5) 
++ 
(6) 
+++ 
(7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
Ik ben bereid om suggesties voor veranderingen te doen, omdat 
ik mij betrokken voel. (1) 
                  
Ik ben niet bereid om suggesties voor veranderingen te doen, 
omdat ik bang ben voor de gevolgen. (2) 
                  
Ik geef mijn leidinggevende suggesties hoe we dingen beter 
zouden kunnen aanpakken, zelfs als anderen het niet me met 
eens zijn. (3) 
                  
Ik word gestimuleerd om mijn zorgen over (sociale) veiligheid te 
delen. (4) 
                  
Het is zonde van mijn tijd om ideeën voor verbetering te delen. 
(5) 
                  
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Blok 2: Perceptie over (Management, Openheid, Eerlijkheid/rechtvaardigheid) (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal 
mee oneens 
(1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal 
mee eens (7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
Over het algemeen is het verstandiger om te 
zeggen dat je het eens bent met het 
management, zelfs als dat niet waar is. (1) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team is het moeilijk 
om een beslissing te nemen zonder 
toestemming van een leidinggevende. (2) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team zijn er strikte 
procedures en richtlijnen die bepalen hoe er 
gewerkt dient te worden. (3) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling zijn er flinke statusverschillen 
tussen verschillende functiegroepen. (4) 
                  
Tijdens mijn werk word ik door mijn 
leidinggevende wel erg in de gaten gehouden. 
(5) 
                  
 
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal 
mee oneens 
(1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal 
mee eens (7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
We worden geïnformeerd als er iets mis is 
gegaan op mijn afdeling/in mijn team. (1) 
                  
Als ik een goed idee zou hebben voor 
verbetering, denk ik dat mijn suggestie goed 
bestudeerd en serieus genomen zou worden. 
(2) 
                  
We krijgen feedback over veranderingen die 
plaatsvinden als gevolg van gemelde 
incidenten en/of calamiteiten. (3) 
                  
Ik kan mijn leidinggevende gemakkelijk 
benaderen om mijn zorgen te uiten. (4) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team heerst een open 
sfeer, waarin alles  besproken kan worden. (5) 
                  
 
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal 
mee oneens 
(1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal 
mee eens 
(7) 
Weet 
niet 
(8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
Dit ziekenhuis gebruikt eerlijke en rechtvaardige 
methoden om de betrokkenheid van 
medewerkers bij gemaakte incidenten en/of 
calamiteiten te onderzoeken. (1) 
                  
Ik vertrouw erop dat dit ziekenhuis haar 
medewerkers eerlijk en rechtvaardig behandelt. 
(2) 
                  
De beoordeling van mijn functioneren is niet in 
lijn met mijn kwaliteiten. Een onafhankelijk 
persoon zou een ander oordeel over mijn 
werkzaamheden hebben (3) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team heerst een sfeer 
van rechtvaardigheid en eerlijkheid. (4) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team gelden de regels 
voor iedereen op dezelfde manier. (5) 
                  
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Blok 3: Gevoelens  (Psychologische veiligheid, vertrouwen, Angst) (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal mee 
oneens (1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal 
mee eens (7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team kunnen 
problemen besproken worden. (1) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team worden 
nieuwe ideeën gewaardeerd. (2) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team wordt het 
hebben van meningsverschillen toegejuicht. 
(3) 
                  
Als je een fout maakt op mijn afdeling/in 
mijn team, wordt die vaak tegen je gebruikt. 
(4) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team geven we 
elkaar tips om de (sociale) veiligheid te 
vergroten. (5) 
                  
 
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal mee 
oneens (1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal 
mee eens (7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team vertrouwen we 
elkaar. (1) 
                  
Ik vertrouw erop dat mijn leidinggevende de 
juiste dingen doet. (2) 
                  
Het management houdt zich niet aan de 
eigen regels. (3) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team heerst een 
sfeer waarin we met elkaar samenwerken en 
elkaar ondersteunen. (4) 
                  
Ik kan met zekerheid zeggen dat de mensen 
op mijn afdeling/in mijn team hun best doen. 
(5) 
                  
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal mee 
oneens (1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal mee 
eens (7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
Ik ben bang dat een fout mijn reputatie 
schaadt. (1) 
                  
Ik ben bang voor eventuele sancties als ik 
een fout gemaakt heb. (2) 
                  
Ik vertrouw erop dat ik rechtvaardig 
word behandeld als ik een fout toegeef. 
(3) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team is het 
beter om fouten maar niet toe te geven. 
(4) 
                  
Ik ben bang dat ik de schuld krijg, ook al 
is het niet (alleen) mijn fout. (5) 
                  
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Onderwijs (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? Tijdens mijn medische opleiding heb ik nuttige informatie gehad over… 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal mee 
oneens (1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal 
mee eens (7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
…hoe ik incidenten en/of calamiteiten kan 
rapporteren. 
 (1) 
                  
… waarom ik incidenten en/of calamiteiten 
zou rapporteren. 
 (2) 
                  
… (sociale) veiligheid in de zorg. 
 (3) 
                  
…het belang van leren van incidenten en/of 
calamiteiten. 
 (4) 
                  
… wat er gedaan wordt met gerapporteerde 
incidenten en/of calamiteiten. 
(5) 
…de rechtmatige procedures en gevolgen 
voor mij en de patiënt na een incident en/of 
calamiteit. 
(6) 
                  
 
 
Beschuldigingscultuur (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal mee 
oneens (1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal 
mee eens (7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team is het 
gebruikelijk om iemand anders de schuld te 
geven van je eigen fout. (1) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team is het 
gebruikelijk om te voorkomen dat je de 
schuld krijgt van een fout. (2) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team ligt de focus 
op het individu als er een fout wordt 
geconstateerd. (3) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team krijgt iemand 
de schuld als zich een incident en/of 
calamiteit voordoet. (4) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team heerst een 
cultuur van verwijten. 
                  
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Overige aspecten (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
Vul in: Helemaal mee oneens (- - -) tot Helemaal mee eens (+ + +) 
 Helemaal 
mee oneens 
(1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) Helemaal 
mee eens 
(7) 
Weet 
niet (8) 
Nvt 
(9) 
Op mijn afdeling werken we samen. (1)                   
Op mijn afdeling ondersteunen we elkaar. (2)                   
Op mijn afdeling wordt goed gecommuniceerd. 
(3) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling is een sterk hiërarchische 
structuur. (4) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling wordt verwacht dat je altijd 
perfect functioneert. (5) 
                  
Op mijn afdeling wordt bij de analyse van 
incidenten en/of calamiteiten verder gekeken 
dan de rol van de direct betrokkene. (6) 
                  
 
Op mijn afdeling wordt er bij incidenten en/of 
calamiteiten vooral gekeken of de regels zijn 
overtreden. (7) 
 
                  
Op mijn afdeling zoeken we naar een oplossing 
naar aanleiding van een fout en/of incident in 
plaats van iemand de schuld te geven (8) 
 
                  
 
Rapporteren: praktijk (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
 
Nu volgen enkele vragen over uw ervaring met het rapporteren van incidenten/calamiteiten. 
 
Kunt u een inschatting maken van hoe vaak u in de afgelopen 12 maanden een incident en/of calamiteit heeft gerapporteerd  via het 
officiële meldingssysteem van uw ziekenhuis? … 
 
Kunt u een inschatting maken van hoe vaak u in de afgelopen 12 maanden een incident en/of calamiteit (mede) heeft veroorzaakt? … 
 
Indien u een incident en/of calamiteit niet rapporteerde, wat was hiervoor de reden?... 
 
Nu volgen enkele stellingen over uw leidinggevenden. 
 Nooit 
(1) 
Soms 
(2) 
Regelmatig 
(3) 
Vaak 
(4) 
Altijd 
(5) 
Weet niet 
(6) 
Nvt 
(7) 
Mijn leidinggevenden hechten veel belang aan veilig en 
gezond werken (1) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden geven veiligheid een hoge 
prioriteit (2) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden nemen de veiligheidsregels 
serieus (3) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden hebben een geloofwaardige 
veiligheidsboodschap (4) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden zijn consistent (5)               
Mijn leidinggevenden komen beloftes na (6)               
Mijn leidinggevenden geven het goede voorbeeld (7)               
Mijn leidinggevenden inspireren medewerkers om zich 
veilig te gedragen (8) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden doen ook zelf wat zij van anderen 
vragen (9) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden begrijpen goed wat er op de 
afdeling gebeurt (10) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden hebben inzicht in de manier 
waarop er gewerkt wordt (11) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden zijn op de hoogte van problemen 
op de afdeling (12) 
              
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Safety@core business (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
 
Tot slot enkele stellingen over uw direct leidinggevende. 
 Nooit 
(1) 
Soms 
(2) 
Regelmatig 
(3) 
Vaak 
(4) 
Altijd 
(5) 
Weet niet 
(6) 
Nvt 
(7) 
Mijn leidinggevenden hechten veel belang aan veilig en 
gezond werken (1) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden geven veiligheid een hoge 
prioriteit (2) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden nemen de veiligheidsregels 
serieus (3) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden hebben een geloofwaardige 
veiligheidsboodschap (4) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden zijn consistent (5)               
Mijn leidinggevenden komen beloftes na (6)               
Mijn leidinggevenden geven het goede voorbeeld (7)               
Mijn leidinggevenden inspireren medewerkers om zich 
veilig te gedragen (8) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden doen ook zelf wat zij van anderen 
vragen (9) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden begrijpen goed wat er op de 
afdeling gebeurt (10) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden hebben inzicht in de manier 
waarop er gewerkt wordt (11) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden zijn op de hoogte van problemen 
op de afdeling (12) 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden begrijpen wat op de afdeling 
belangrijk is (13) 
 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden vinden integriteit belangrijk. (14)               
 
 
Multifactoriële leiderschapsquestionnaire (tussenkoppen worden niet weergegeven in definitieve vragenlijst) 
 Nooit 
(1) 
Soms 
(2) 
Regelmatig 
(3) 
Vaak 
(4) 
Altijd 
(5) 
Weet 
niet (6) 
Nvt 
(7) 
Wanneer alles gaat zoals gepland, probeert hij/zij mij 
niet te verbeteren. (1)               
Hij/zij neemt de tijd om te ontdekken wat ik nodig heb. 
(2)               
Ik kan krijgen wat ik wil, als ik werk lever zoals dat is 
afgesproken. (3)               
Ik vertrouw hem/haar in het oplossen van obstakels. (4)               
Hij/zij besteedt aandacht aan de fouten die ik heb 
gemaakt. (5)               
Hij/zij verandert bedreigende situaties in 
mogelijkheden. (6)               
Hij/zij zorgt ervoor dat ik nadenk over zaken die ik altijd 
aan heb genomen. (7)               
Het werk wat ik doe voor hem/haar, bepaalt wat ik               
Mijn leidinggevenden begrijpen wat op de afdeling 
belangrijk is (13) 
 
              
Mijn leidinggevenden vinden integriteit belangrijk. (14)               
               
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ervoor terugkrijg. (8) 
Hij/zij onderneemt pas actie als er iets fout gaat. (9)               
Hij/zij beveelt ons aan voor promotie en/of bonussen, 
wanneer ik dat verdiend heb. (10)               
Hij/zij werkt één-op-één samen met mij. (11)               
Hij/zij coacht mij. (12)               
Hij/zij neemt de eerste stap als er een risico is voor ons 
beiden. (13)               
Hij/zij vertelt me wat ik moet doen om beloond te 
worden. (14)               
Hij/zij wekt nieuwsgierigheid bij me op over nieuwe 
manieren van werken. (15) 
              
Hij/zij beloont me als ik goed werk aflever. (16)               
Hij/zij zorgt dat ik minder kritisch kijk naar creatieve 
ideeën. (17) 
              
Hij/zij handhaaft de regels als taken niet gedaan 
worden. (18) 
              
Hij/zij geeft mij redenen om te geloven in wat ik kan. 
(19) 
              
Hij/zij houdt mijn gemaakte fouten nauwlettend in de 
gaten. (20) 
              
Hij/zij laat mij geen nederlaag accepteren. (21)               
Hij/zij laat bezorgdheid zien om fouten te voorkomen. 
(22) 
              
hij/zij zorgt ervoor dat ik krijg wat ik wil in ruil voor mijn 
prestaties. (23)  
              
Hij/zij is voor mij een symbool van succes en 
bekwaamheid. 
(24) 
              
 
Dit was de laatste vraag. Hartelijk dank voor uw deelname aan dit onderzoek! Onderstaand vindt u aanvullende 
informatie over de achtergrond en reden van dit onderzoek.  
In ziekenhuizen kan de cultuur binnen de organisatie een sterke invloed hebben op de patiëntveiligheid. In een open 
cultuur worden fouten gemeld en kan personeel kritisch zijn op elkaar. Dit wordt een just culture genoemd. Aan de 
andere kant van dit spectrum ligt een blame culture. Als er een hoge mate van just culture is, kan er geleerd worden van 
gemaakte fouten, wat positief is voor de patiëntveiligheid en kwaliteit van zorg. Hoewel deze just/blame culture al tot op 
bepaalde hoogte is onderzocht, blijft het precieze mechanisme hierachter onduidelijk. Om dit te onderzoeken is een 
vragenlijst ontwikkeld, die wij willen testen op psychometrische kwaliteiten.  
 
Door deelname aan dit onderzoek, heeft u een bijdrage geleverd aan het onderzoek naar de cultuur binnen zorginstellingen. 
Hiermee kan het leervermogen van de organisatie verhoogd worden en daarmee ook de patiëntveiligheid. Uiteindelijk leidt 
dit tot een betere kwaliteit van zorg, waar niet alleen patiënten maar ook personeel van zorginstellingen baat bij hebben. 
 
Bij eventuele vragen of opmerkingen kunt u contact opnemen met k.m.vanwijk@umail.leidenuniv.nl, 
s.komen@umail.leidenuniv.nl of groeneweg@fsw.leidenuniv.nl. 
Onder de deelnemers verloten wij bol.com cadeaubonnen. Wilt u kans maken? Vul dan hieronder uw e-
mailadres in. 
NB. Dit e-mailadres wordt niet gekoppeld aan uw antwoorden en zal enkel gebruikt worden voor verloting van de cadeaubonnen. 
Klik op volgende om uw antwoorden op te slaan en de enquête te beëindigen. 
  
54 
 
Appendix B 
Figures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1. Scree plot of the principal component analysis of the 
just/blame culture questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure B2. Normal P-P plot of the total mean score on the just/blame 
culture questionnaire and the transformational leadership style construct. 
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Appendix C 
Additional information on the removal of items 
 
 
Item Item name Change in reliability 
Reporting 3 Angst voor de eventuele gevolgen weerhouden mij ervan om incidenten 
en/of calamiteiten te melden. 
Item implies fear and increased reliability fear, so moved to fear. 
Reporting .196  .546 
Fear .471  .549 
Reporting 4 Incidenten en/of calamiteiten die zich binnen mijn team/op mijn afdeling 
voordoen, worden door anderen gemeld. 
Item removed. 
Reporting .546  .700 
Learning 5 Dezelfde fouten worden steeds opnieuw gemaakt, omdat hier niets 
verandert. 
Moved to management. 
Learning .374  .684 
Management .687  .705 
Speaking up 2 Ik ben niet bereid om suggesties voor veranderingen te doen, omdat ik 
bang ben voor de gevolgen. 
Item implies fear and increased reliability fear, so moved to fear. 
Speaking up -.052  .387 
Fear .549  .652 
Speaking up 5 Het is zonde van mijn tijd om ideeën voor verbetering te delen. 
Moved to management. 
Speaking up .387  .799 
Management .705  .740 
Fairness 3 De beoordeling van mijn functioneren is niet in lijn met mijn kwaliteiten. 
Een onafhankelijk persoon zou een ander oordeel over mijn 
werkzaamheden hebben. 
Moved to management.  
Fairness .465  .792 
Management .740  .763 
Trust 3 Het management houdt zich niet aan de eigen regels. 
Moved to management. 
Trust .529  .830 
Management .763  .763 
Psych. Safety 4 Als je een fout maakt op mijn afdeling/in mijn team, wordt die vaak tegen 
je gebruikt. 
Moved to fear. 
Psych. Safety .413  .738 
Fear .652  .716 
Fear 3 Ik vertrouw erop dat ik rechtvaardig wordt behandeld als ik een fout 
toegeef. 
Moved to fairness. 
Fear .716  .815 
Fairness .792  .803 
Psych. Safety 1 Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team kunnen problemen besproken worden. 
Moved to openness. 
Openness .864  .877 
Psych. Safety 2 Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team worden nieuwe ideeën gewaardeerd. 
Moved to learning. 
Learning .684  .713 
Psych. Safety 3 Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team wordt het hebben van meningsverschillen 
toegejuicht. 
Moved to openness. 
Openness .877  .866 
Psych. Safety 5 Op mijn afdeling/in mijn team geven we elkaar tips om de (sociale) 
veiligheid te vergroten. 
Learning .713  .757 
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Moved to learning. 
Other aspects 1 Op mijn afdeling werken we samen. 
Moved to trust. 
Trust .830  .858 
Other aspects 2 Op mijn afdeling ondersteunen we elkaar. 
Moved to trust. 
Trust .858  .887 
Other aspects 3 Op mijn afdeling wordt goed gecommuniceerd. 
Item seems related to openness, so item moved to openness. 
Openness .866  .882 
Other aspects 4 Op mijn afdeling is een sterk hiërarchische structuur. 
Item seems related to management, so item moved to management. 
Management .763  .792 
Other aspects 5 Op mijn afdeling wordt verwacht dat je altijd perfect functioneert. 
Moved to fear. 
Fear .815  .799 
Combined with other 
aspects 7  .817 
Other aspects 6 Op mijn afdeling wordt bij de analyse van incidenten verder gekeken dan 
de rol van de direct betrokkene. 
Moved to learning. 
Learning .767  .766 
Other aspects 7 Op mijn afdeling wordt er bij incidenten en/of calamiteiten vooral gekeken 
of de regels zijn overtreden. 
Moved to fear. 
Fear .815  .828 
Other aspects 8 Op mijn afdeling zoeken we naar een oplossing naar aanleiding van een 
fout en/of incident in plaats van iemand de schuld te geven. 
Moved to learning. 
Learning .766  .797 
 
